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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of the education of entrepreneurs, which we 
hypothesise to be a signal of talent, on the adoption of variable pay (VP) schemes in the 
Italian economy.  
We estimate to what extent differences in the diffusion of VP between Italian firms reflect 
differences in the quality of entrepreneurs. Our estimates, which we obtained by taking both 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity into account, validate hypotheses about the direct 
positive effects of entrepreneurs’ education on the adoption of VP schemes. Furthermore, we 
ascertain the role of entrepreneurs’ education by examining its influence on the choice 
between different types of VP bonuses at the individual, group, or establishment levels. Our 
results suggest that highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to use individual or 
collective forms of VP schemes at the establishment level rather than team VP incentives. 
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Much of the recent applied research has shown that substantial productivity differences between 
firms are explained by differences in their ‘managerial quality’ and their recourse to good 
management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Practices that are ‘good’ for firm 
productivity include incentives, and thus, pay and bonuses that reward effort and select employees 
with higher ability, as shown by the most representative empirical studies of this literature (see 
Bryson et al. 2012 for a recent survey). Indeed, a vast number of contributions have highlighted the 
‘power of incentives’ (Lazear, 2000; Prendergast, 1999) and paid close attention to interactions with 
other packages of effective workplace strategies. This body of work has given rise to many 
contributions that explore the ‘value of the complementary role of human resource practices’ on 
nationally representative samples of enterprises (Black and Lynch, 2001) or insider econometric 
case studies within firms (Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003).  
A whole set of determinants, such as firm specialisation and size, technology, human capital 
endowments of the workforce, and trade-union influence, have been considered as key factors that 
underlie a typical firm’s propensity to introduce incentives. However, the decisional process behind 
the adoption of these ‘good’ practices has not been examined as thoroughly. Indeed, little is known 
about decisions on these practices, for instance, on collective bonuses and profit sharing, which was 
recently argued for by Poutsma, Blasi and Kruse (2012) in their introductory contribution to a 
special issue on this topic
1
.   
In particular, few available studies consider the quality of entrepreneurs in terms of their 
education as a proxy for unobserved leader-specific traits and as a driving force behind the adoption 
of variable pay (VP).
2
 The lack of evidence on this issue is rather surprising because a high level of 
human capital of entrepreneurs is expected to translate into modern management practices and 
personnel policies that in turn favour the adoption of performance-related-pay and other forms of 
wage flexibility at the firm level (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2011). These policies bring to the 
frontline the role of the entrepreneur, who may exert his influence by affecting a whole set of 
economic activities that create value, as originally assessed by Baumol (1968). Moreover, Baumol 
(1990) also paid attention to those entrepreneurial actions that do not increase the firm’s value but 
lead to the capture of rents. However, following Lazear (2012) we focus exclusively on those 
aspects of leadership that enhance productivity, such as the implementation of incentives. 
In this paper, we investigate the diffusion of variable pay (VP) schemes in Italian manufacturing 
and service firms by focusing on the influence of the education of entrepreneurs with respect to the 
adoption of these schemes. One of the features that represents a major trait of the Italian economy is 
its great fragmentation into small firms, and in this economy, owners of small firms usually adopt 
                                                          
1
 For recent contributions on profit sharing, see the Special Issue on ‘Employee share ownership and profit sharing in 
different institutional contexts’, which can be found in The International Journal of Human Resource Management, 
2012, Vol. 23, No. 8. 
2
 Bandiera et al. (2011) use the education of managers as a measure of their talent but consider this factor from a 
different perspective: they explore the match between firms and managers and conclude that highly talented and less 
risk-averse managers tend to match with firms that value these characteristics the most.  
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firm strategies as independent entrepreneurs. In contrast, external managers are less common. We 
expect that management skills are important leadership features for successful entrepreneurs and 
that such skills lead to a wider adoption of VP. In our analysis, following the literature on personnel 
economics, we hypothesise that education is a ‘signal of talent’ (Lazear and Shaw, 2007) and 
evaluate to what extent differences in the diffusion of VP between Italian firms reflect differences 
in the quality of entrepreneurs. 
We test this hypothesis by performing an empirical analysis based on a large sample of Italian 
firms for which we have data on entrepreneurs’ levels of education and age; additionally, we have a 
rich set of information about business activities (innovation, exports, training, and the use of fixed-
term contracts) and the workforce’s composition (by gender and education). In particular, we use 
data from the Employer and Employee Survey (EES) for the year 2010, which were provided from 
ISFOL (the Italian Institute for the Development of Workers’ Professional Training) on a sample of 
over 20,000 Italian firms that operate in both manufacturing and the service sector. By using micro-
data from a representative sample of Italian firms, we contribute to highlitight the PRP experience 
in Italy, whereas all of the previous research has been restricted to large companies, selected sectors 
or particular areas in the north of the country (see Amisano and Del Boca, 2004; Origo, 2009). 
Thus, our major contribution comes from a broader evaluation of the role of entrepreneurs’ 
education on the intensity of variable pay. To our knowledge, this issue is considered for the first 
time in this paper for the whole sample of Italian firms, not only for large firms, but also small 
enterprises. Second, we ascertain the role of entrepreneurs’ education by looking at its influence on 
the choice of different incentives and bonuses at the individual, group, and establishment levels. 
Finally, our estimates, which were obtained by taking both endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity into account, validate our hypotheses about the direct positive effects of education on 
VP variables. Furthermore, our estimates may be useful for addressing policy concerns given that 
the Italian system of industrial relations is currently under pressure and new measures to promote 
growth and solve the deep Italian structural crisis are being debated. These measures include the 
increased diffusion of wage-incentive schemes to tailor wages to firms’ specific needs and promote 
productivity growth, and according to our estimates, enhance the selection and promotion of high-
quality entrepreneurs. 
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the related literature, Section 3 
presents the Italian data that were used and descriptive statistics, Section 4 illustrates the 





The primary goal of this paper is to examine the diffusion of VP schemes and the role of the 
educational profile of the individual entrepreneur as a potential determinant of these schemes, 
which are offered at the individual, team, or establishment level. This study is thus related to two 
 4 
 
main fields of the literature: the first strand concerns individual and collective incentives and 
examines both positive and dysfunctional responses to these practices; the second relevant strand 
focuses on the role of the quality of entrepreneurs in formulating personnel policies that may 
contribute to the proper selection of incentive schemes. 
Individual incentives 
Much of the literature on wage incentives is grounded in agency theory. Its main model surmises 
that individual bonuses that are linked to performance may be an efficacious device to motivate 
individual employees. A large number of studies (which have been appraised by Prendergast 
(1999)) note that the ‘power of incentives’ depends above all on sorting and motivation. The 
adoption of variable contracts that link rewards to performance results motivates employed workers 
to exert more effort, and when there is heterogeneity among the workers, permits firms to attract 
workers of higher skill who produce more with the same level of effort (Lazear, 2000). Indeed, 
most of the studies that estimate the separate effects of incentives and selection show that around 
one-third of the observed increases in performance arise from attracting workers with higher 
abilities
3
 (Prendergast, 1999, section 2.1.3). 
However, a number of controversial issues have emerged in the literature, and most of these 
issues are related to the difficulties of objective performance measurement (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992) and the complexity of correctly rewarding effort in settings where 
parties (the principal and the agent) cannot write enforceable contracts (Baker, 1992). 
Another key issue in this literature is the trade‐off between risk and incentives: a provision of 
pay‐per‐performance imposes additional risk on workers and leads the entrepreneur to provide 
substantial risk compensation through higher wages. In this context, VP schemes are less frequent 
when workers are more risk-averse; or noisy performance measures are more frequent (Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1990). Performance measures can be improved by making them conditional on an 
employee’s relative performance rather than absolute standards; in this way, firms can use the 
performance of a group of workers to filter out the effect of shocks that are common to the whole 
group, and thus, firms can lower the risk imposed on individual workers (Gibbons and Murphy, 
1990). 
However, when wages are linked to relative performance, employees may underperform, as 
employees whose efforts impose negative externalities on their fellows internalise the fear of 
retaliation;  as empirically found by Bandiera et al. (2006).  
Other dysfunctional responses to incentives are formalised by the ‘multitask principal-agent 
model’ that better represents the multi-dimensional tasks of employees in environments 
characterised by competing worker activities (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Under these 
circumstances, a firm may not be able to correctly measure the output of all tasks. Thus, there may 
                                                          
3
 Lazear (2000) found in his case study that those pay settings that changed from rewards based on input 
measures to payments related to output outcomes induced dramatic improvements; moreover, half of these 
improvements were explained by the attraction of workers of higher ability.  
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be a misallocation of activities towards those that are more highly compensated and away from 
those activities that earn less compensation, which would cause undesirable trade-offs across tasks.  
More generally, agents can ‘game’ the compensation system (Backer, 1992)4, especially when 
explicit incentive contracts cannot completely specify all relevant aspects of worker behaviour; in 
these settings, the importance of subjective evaluations (i.e., measures that are not verifiable by a 
third party) emerge (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994). Thus, decisions on pay are under the 
discretion of superiors in the hierarchy, which might cause favouritism or discretionary behaviour 
(Prendergast and Topel, 1996). To prevent subjective assessments giving rise to biases, a more 
holistic view of performance is important, and the quality of leaders comes to the forefront. 
  
Team incentives 
Measurement problems are particularly relevant in settings where firm performance is the result 
of the joint contributions of many individuals and individual performance is difficult to measure 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). It introduces the importance of team production and group 
incentives. One main aspect emerges from these incentives: the very fact that incentives are 
collective may induce employees to free-ride on the efforts of others, which would cut productivity. 
On the positive side, group incentives may lead to decentralised monitoring due to peer pressure 
and shame norms (Kandel and Lazear, 1992), which would mitigate opportunistic behaviour. 
However, the evidence does not always support these positive impacts and some empirical studies 
show that team-based compensations decrease the performance of those who are more productive 
(Weiss, 1987; Hansen, 1997) and that team production is more attractive to the less able workers, 
which causes adverse selection effects (Prendergast, 1999).  
Other arguments against team incentives, i.e., incentives that appear to violate the standard 
agency theory, have come from such authors as Tirole (1986), who show the possibility of collusion 
among agents. This possibility makes a bureaucratic system superior to collective incentives. An 
alternative is represented by employee financial participation, as shown below. 
 
Collective incentives and employee financial participation  
When the group whose performance is being compensated is the firm or the establishment, group 
performance pay becomes financial participation (Bryson et al. 2012). Employees in firms with 
‘shared capitalism’ (i.e., those firms with profit-sharing and/or employee share ownership) respond 
more readily to the shirking of their colleagues. Indeed, the provision of group incentives may lead 
to superior Nash equilibria, which are associated with high levels of productivity due to increased 
cooperation and lower monitoring costs (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987). More generally, a plausible way 
to quell free-riding attitudes is to promote a cooperative culture and employee participation in 
                                                          
4
 The model of Baker (1992) shows a situation where a firm wants to maximise a non-contractible objective 
(say, V) but can write a compensation contract on another measure (call it P) that is only imperfectly 
correlated with V. Thus, the employee who has private information about how his own effort affects both P 
and V can exert effort that has a large effect on P but not V, which would imply that the compensation 
contract drives both effort and gaming at the same time. 
 6 
 
decision-making; similar to financial participation, cooperation and participation is a policy that 
contributes to increasing commitment (Blinder, ed., 1990; Jones and Pliskin, 1991; Kruse et al. 
2010). 
Profit sharing is held to generate beneficial effects in the form of higher effort and work quality, 
higher commitment and incentives due to firm-specific human capital, better teamwork, greater 
workforce cooperation in adapting to new technology and organisational changes, lower labour 
turnover and longer average tenure (Jones and Pliskin, 1991). Indeed, a growing body of research 
suggests on empirical grounds that the profit sharing-productivity relationship may be positive,  as 
shown by the first report of the experience in EC countries (Uvalic, 1991) as well as other studies 
on major industrialised economies (Pérotin and Robinson, 2003). The recorded experiences in more 
than twenty countries offer empirical evidence of the positive or at least neutral effects of these 
policies on productivity, and the discrepancies may be attributed ‘to differences in participatory 
practices in firms with profit-sharing plans’ (Pérotin and Robinson, 2003, p. 22).  
Recent advances in this field highlight the importance of taking into account ‘actors’ decisions 
on different levels in shaping the form and the use of financial participation’ (Poutsma, Blasy and 
Kruse, 2012, p. 1517). To begin to develop these arguments, we consider the role of a crucial actor: 
the entrepreneur. 
 
Incentives and entrepreneurship  
From our short review, it emerges that various distortions in individual and collective incentives 
that might limit their usage are clearly documented in many studies; these problems are especially 
relevant when such incentive schemes are badly designed. However, the overall evaluation offered 
by the survey carried out by Bloom and Van Reenen (2011) is that ‘these distortions are not 
generally overwhelming’ and favourable arguments for the adoption of incentive pay prevail. 
However, it is conceivable that a crucial aspect is represented by well-designed compensation 
systems that mitigate many of their own potential distortions and stimulate the adoption of effective 
practices. Our analysis is intended to explore how high-level skills and the education of the 
entrepreneur influence the adoption of good practices (which are represented by VP). To that end, a 
useful starting point is represented by the contribution of Lazear (2004), who proved that 
entrepreneurs have to perform many tasks and that ‘individuals who become entrepreneurs should 
have a more balanced investment strategy on average than those who end up specialising as wage 
and salary workers’ (ibidem, p. 209)5. One reasonable indicator of these general skills is captured 
by the level of education.  
                                                          
5
 In Lazear’s model,, any given amount of availability x takes the form of amounts of ability of types a and b; i.e., 
x=a+b. A generalist leader with balanced levels of a and b is more likely to choose the correct action when he faces a 
random problem. A random problem is a problem that can be solved using ability a, which is encountered with a 
probability of  or a problem that can be solved using ability b, which occurs with a probability of (1-). The 
probability of successfully making a good decision (that has a value k) is a function (G) of the abilities and the expected 
value of a decision; this function is as follows:  
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Indeed, following the seminal works of Mincer (1974) and Becker (1975), education is 
acknowledged as one of the most relevant components of general human capital. Furthermore, 
education can be tested as an important source of skills, problem-solving ability, discipline and 
motivation (Ucbasaran, Westhead and Wright, 2012). Thus, there are a number of channels through 
which the education of entrepreneurs may potentially lead to better-designed workplace practices 
and thereby affect the propensity to adopt VP.  
First, attending school provides entrepreneurs a broad and balanced set of observable and 
unobservable skills and capabilities that are valuable both for introducing the best practices in 
human resource management and for operating efficient, complex economic organisations. For 
instance, Garicano and Hubbard (2005) find evidence of positive sorting effects in law firms by 
measuring lawyers’ skills based on their education and experience, whereas Cooper et al. (2004) 
show that general human capital, which is represented by the entrepreneur's education, is an 
important factor for predicting the success of new ventures. Baptista et al. (2013) performed wage 
regressions for small Portuguese firms and showed that a higher level of education and experience 
in the entrepreneur implies a higher wage premium for workers. In addition, they show that 
workers’ wages reflect the value of the match with an entrepreneur’s skills. Thus, entrepreneurial 
skills have an impact not only on job creation but also on the quality of the jobs that are created. 
Furthermore, the education of entrepreneurs is valuable mainly in a period of technological and 
organisational changes. In such a period, these changes call for a diffusion of variable pay, for 
instance, following the diffusion of ICT – companies (Bresnahan, et al. 2000) or changes in the 
formal authority structure, e.g., in the ‘flattening firm’ (Rajan and Wulf, 2006).  
Secondly, well-educated entrepreneurs are likely to have a deeper knowledge of those modern 
management practices that assign increasing importance to the adoption of holistic forms of 
workplace organisation, including self-managed teams, multi-tasking and the delegation of decision 
rights. In accordance with theories of super-modular optimisation and complementarities (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1995), these bundles of strategies reveal a way to correct those inefficiencies that are 
related to rewarding workers for completing complex jobs that cannot be regulated by explicit 
contracts, and therefore, that call for implicit agreements (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 1994). 
Among these agreements, it is plausible to include wage bonuses at the firm level that are linked to 
enterprise results, and this setup is captured in our analysis in the form of VP schemes.  
A last set of considerations is related to the choice by the entrepreneur of individual versus group 
incentive schemes. One strand of the literature emphasises how high-quality leadership is expected 
to encourage cooperation and trust between individuals, as stressed by the literature on behavioural 
economics. Thus, the propensity of highly educated entrepreneurs to use variable contracts reveals a 
commitment device that minimises opportunistic behaviour and favours reciprocity at the 
workplace. As a related argument, notice that a significant share of workers have a preference for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Value =[ G(a)+( 1- ) G(x-a)]k. If G(.) is concave, then the first-order condition of the maximisation problem yields 
a maximum by diversification. At very high levels of ability, the G function is certain to be concave, and as shown by 




fairness that leads them to care about others’ wages, as shown by Kahneman et al. (1986), Fehr and 
Gachter (2000) and their laboratory experiments. In our analysis, broad-based employee-financial 
participation, i.e., bonuses paid at the firm level, may guarantee an equal split that motivates 
workers and balances the negative side-effects of opportunism that are caused by free-riding. One 
important aspect of profit-sharing firms’ human-resource-management strategies may be offering 
equal-opportunity practices that can reduce existing inequalities (Pérotin and Robinson, 2003).  
Of course, there are a number of other direct and indirect mechanisms though which the 
schooling level of entrepreneurs may potentially affect the internal labour market, organisation and 
particularly wage incentives. However, in this paper we focus on how the education level of 
entrepreneurs captures a multidimensional set of observable and unobservable skills as well as 
behavioural traits that are expected to be positively associated with both the overall use of VP and 
the specific design of VP incentives, which can be offered at the individual, team or establishment 
level. 
Furthermore, along with the education of entrepreneurs, our rich dataset allows us to introduce a 
number of control variables that have been considered relevant in the related literature. First, we 
include a corporate-governance variable to take into account the situation when a firm is run by 
owners or by external managers, as the separation between ownership and control may significantly 
influence the choice of firms’ strategies, as widely debated in the survey paper of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997).  
In addition, in conformity with related studies, we introduce the sector and firm size (Brown, 
1990), firms’ geographical locations and export strategies (as in the literature reviewed by Bernard 
et al. 2007), the presence of unions (Black and Linch, 2001), and training (Gielen, 2011). Finally, 
we consider technology and innovation that may significantly influence workplace organisation, as 
shown in Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). In sum, our rich dataset allows us to examine 
the influence of entrepreneurs’ education, control for a wide spectrum of covariates and undertake a 
comprehensive evaluation of VP in the recent experience of Italian firms. 
 
2.2. The Italian case 
Italy is characterised by a two-tier bargaining regime that was established by the July 1993 
National Income Agreement. According to this agreement, the Italian institutional setting is 
characterised by wage contracts at the sectoral level that link wages to the target inflation rate, 
whereas decentralised bargaining should distribute wage premiums that are linked to productivity or 
firm results. This institutional setting should have provided sufficient space for wage compensation 
schemes that are linked to efficiency gains to promote both the reorganisation of and innovation in 
productive processes. However, the few empirical works that highlight the degree of diffusion of 
incentive schemes that are offered at the firm level reveal a limited diffusion of these practices. 
A number of official studies have examined the application of the bargaining rules regarding 
decentralised negotiation that were introduced by the 1993 Agreement. The first official national 
survey on employee financial participation was undertaken in 1997 by the Italian Statistical Institute 
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(ISTAT). This survey showed that whereas the number of workers involved in financial 
participation schemes in 1995-96 was approximately 23% of the total population of Italian workers, 
individual production bonuses were paid to only 12.5% of employees. Because ISTAT has never 
replicated its 1999 survey, it remains a one-time inquiry.  
Other sparse and fragmented information has been made available from other sources over the 
last decade. Although the Bank of Italy never performed any specific investigations, it integrated 
some questions on the incidence of decentralised agreements and bonuses linked to enterprise 
performance into its Invid questionnaire (which was created to explore different economic issues). 
The responses to these questions provide evidence of the declining importance over time of local 
bargaining and the marginal importance of VP, as in 2008 VP represented only 4% of the total 
compensation package (Casadio, 2010).  
Two international surveys provide a comparative perspective: the CRANET, which is an e-
survey of a sample that was selected randomly from the population of companies with at least 200 
employees, and the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), which is a household survey 
that was conducted for 29 European countries (Lowitzsch et al., 2009). Both sources document an 
increasing percentage of employees and firms involved in VP schemes such as profit-sharing in 
European countries, but Italy is among the few exceptions to this trend. 
However, the evidence described to date has been limited in terms of firm size and the sectors 
that were examined. This evidence may be enriched by the ISFOL survey, which we discuss below. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data  
Our empirical analysis is based on information obtained by the Employer and Employee Survey 
(RIL) that was conducted by ISFOL in 2010 on a representative sample of 25,000 partnerships and 
limited firms that operated in the non-agricultural private sector.  
The RIL survey collects a rich set of information about personnel organisation, industrial 
relations and other workplace characteristics. In particular, the RIL survey provides data on the 
educational levels and other demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs along with information on 
the intensity of VP. Indeed, from the dataset we know whether VP schemes are based on firm, 
group or individual performance. In addition, we have information on other firm personnel policies 
(such as the use of fixed-term contracts), industrial relations (which are captured by the presence of 
unions), productive specialisation and firms’ strategies (i.e., their innovation and export activities) 
(see the Appendix for detailed definitions of all of the variables from RIL).  
Furthermore, the RIL data allow us to perform an up-to-date analysis on a key (but almost 
unknown) feature of the Italian productive system: the behaviour of partnership firms. Actually, to 
the best of our knowledge there are no empirical studies based on rich information from 
representative samples of both limited and partnership firms in Italy that were sampled without any 
sectoral, geographical or dimensional limitations.  
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Given the focus of this paper, we exclude firms with fewer than five employees, and we apply a 
filter to retain only those firms that are characterised by a minimum level of organisational 
structure. Furthermore, we exclude firms with missing data on the key variables. Thus, the final 
sample over which the analysis is performed includes approximately 10,000 firms.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for 2010. In our sample, 89% of the firms were run by 
families and only 1% were large firms (i.e., firms with more than 250 employees). In addition, even 
by excluding firms with fewer than five employees, we obtain that the majority of firms (nearly 
70%) were in the class 5<the number of employees<15. From the data reported in Table 1, we have 
confirmation of the limited diffusion of VP: only 6% of the surveyed firms had a VP scheme in 
place in 2010, and after differentiating the different pay schemes, the highest value is the percentage 
of firms with VP bonuses at the establishment level (4%) and the lowest value corresponds to firms 
with team bonuses (1%).  
The variable that is intended as a proxy for entrepreneurs’ human capital is measured by 
educational degrees. In our sample, 23% of the firms had entrepreneurs with a college degree, 54% 
had entrepreneurs with an upper-secondary-level education, and 22% had entrepreneurs with a 
lower-secondary-level education. To capture additional aspects of the entrepreneurs’ characteristics, 
we consider their ages and obtain that the majority of firms (60%) had entrepreneurs between 39 
and 60 years old. The sectoral distribution of firms records its highest value for manufacturing firms 
(30%), followed by Retail and Wholesale Trade firms (22%).  
Additional characteristics offer a profile of the majority of Italian enterprises that were not 
involved in innovation strategies (only 40% and 32% of firms had undertaken product and process 
innovation, respectively, in the three years before the survey) and were not exposed to international 
trade (only 24% were exporters). Finally, for the workforce characteristics, Table 1 shows that the 
share of trained workers was only approximately 20% of the total employees and only 9% of 
employees had a tertiary level of education. Furthermore, the share of workers with fixed-term 
contracts represented 14% of the total workforce in 2010. 
  
 
4. Econometric analysis 
4.1 The econometric strategy 
Our research question concerns the role of the entrepreneur’s education on the adoption of 
incentive schemes. The first decision is whether to operate a scheme at all; the second choice, on 
which entrepreneurs have considerable discretion, is the selection among the different forms of VP.  
Thus, our econometric analysis is begun by estimating different specifications of the following 
equation:  
 




where the dependent variable VPi is the adoption of a variable pay scheme of any type in firm i, 
entrepreneur_educ is a dummy variable for the education of the entrepreneur (see Appendix , Table 
A1), Xi is a vector that describes the composition of the workforce, Yi is a vector that contains other 
firms and workplace characteristics and i  is an idiosyncratic error term (for details, see the 
Appendix). 
Then, a linear probability model is used to estimate different specifications of equation (1), as 
suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008). However, a potential problem with standard OLS 
estimates is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. In particular, if there 
are unobservable factors that influence both the entrepreneurs’ level of education and the presence 
of VP schemes at the firm level, our OLS estimates might suffer from an omitted variable bias. For 
example, highly educated entrepreneurs might be more likely to be concentrated in firms run by 
professional managers rather than by family members, or they may work in firms characterised by 
high-quality practices and/or cooperative industrial relations; moreover, these workplace 
characteristics are most likely associated with the use of VP. In such circumstances, positive OLS 
estimates of the relation between entrepreneurs’ human capital and the likely use of VP may 
partially reflect unobserved firm heterogeneity rather than skills and behaviour associated with the 
education level of entrepreneurs. To minimise these biases, we estimate different specifications of 
equation (1) by including a large set of variables that capture important observable and 
unobservable characteristics of firms, workers and entrepreneurs. Finally, the reverse-causality 
problem is taken into account to avoid biased estimates, and we used instruments for entrepreneur 
education in order to identify its causal impact on VP.  
We replicate the same estimation strategy (OLS and instrumental-variable Tobit regressions) 
carrying out additional estimates of equation (1). However, we differentiate those VP schemes that 
are based on i) the firm, ii) a group or iii) individual performance. 
 
4.2 The adoption of VP: the main results 
The role of the entrepreneur’s education 
The findings for our VP estimates are reported in Table 2, and they indicate that a higher degree 
of education among managers significantly influences the probability of adopting VP. In particular, 
our estimates show that the presence of managers with a tertiary education level is associated with a 
higher probability of VP with respect to entrepreneurs with a first-level education (the omitted 
category). A lower but significant coefficient is obtained for entrepreneurs with a secondary-level 
education. These results are obtained in the baseline specification, where we control for 
entrepreneurs’ ages and firms’ geographical locations and sizes (model 1). Furthermore, in other 
specifications additional covariates for the workforce characteristics (model 2) and firm 
characteristics (model 3) are inserted. Notice that in all of these specifications, the effect of 
entrepreneurs’ education is statistically significant but relatively small in magnitude. However, the 
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estimated coefficients reflect endogeneity biases, and we confirmed this fact by means of IV 
estimates that give higher coefficients; these estimates are presented below.  
 
Control variables 
Model 3, in which a wide range of variables are controlled for, is particular meaningful. A key 
control variable among the firm characteristics pertains to corporate governance. The research 
question is whether different governance structures explain different firm practices in terms of 
incentives and VP. A burgeoning literature has shown that family firms exert direct control to 
pursue private benefits and that their objective function derives from direct control (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006). Indeed, firms may not adopt the best strategies (in our case, VP) when they are 
owned and run by families because they may prefer other strategies that divert corporate resources 
to obtain private benefits (Morck, Wolfenzon, Yeung, 2004). This issue has a particular relevance in 
our case study because family firms are a special trait of the Italian economy (indeed, they 
constitute 89% of our sample).  
Our results are consistent with the previous literature because we find that family firms are 
negatively associated with VP (see the estimates in Table 2 and Model 2). Thus, these firms ‘may 
twist the choice of the manager towards less talented ones and thus provide a rationale for why they 
might perform worse even when not intrinsically less efficient’ (Bandiera et al. 2011, p. 9).  
Concerning other firm characteristics, it is expected that asymmetric information and monitoring 
costs increase as a firm’s size increases; furthermore, for larger firms the costs of implementing VP 
can be spread over a large number of employees (Brown 1990; Heywood et al. 1997), which could 
explain a positive correlation with VP. In line with these predictions, we find that small Italian firms 
have a low probability of VP, whereas firms with more than 250 employees have nearly a 40% 
greater probability of VP than do the smallest firms (i.e., firms with fewer than 15 employees).  
Exports and a resulting increase in competition may stimulate the use of variable pay to give 
incentives to workers to enhance their productivity (Brown and Heywood 2002; Drago and 
Heywood 1995). This hypothesis is confirmed by the higher wage premium offered in other 
countries by exporting firms (Bernard et al. 2007), and furthermore, it is at least partially verified 
for the Italian economy because the coefficient associated with exposure to international markets is 
positive and significant at the 10% level.  
Unexpectedly, with respect to innovation, we found that firms that declared themselves to have 
undertaken product and process innovation in the three years before the survey did not show a 
higher probability of adopting VP agreements, which reveals an impasse in trends towards the 
implementation of strategies that are devoted to enhancing organisational flexibility; these trends 
emerged in Italy from similar studies in the 1980s (Biagioli and Curatolo, 1989). Our results 
suggest that innovation, technical changes, and increasing uncertainty may make VP less likely, 
which was also found in related studies (Heywood, Hubler and Jirjahn, 1998). 
In addition, our estimations control for worker heterogeneities such as gender, job tenure (the 
share of fixed-term contracts), and education. Our hypothesis is that the heterogeneity of workers 
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(who are differentiated by gender, tenure and skills) will influence the relationships we are testing. 
We find that the main beneficiaries of VP agreements are men, whereas the percentage of women 
has a negative effect on the probability of adopting VP contracts. Furthermore, the incidence of 
temporary contracts emerges with a negative and significant coefficient. One likely interpretation of 
both results is that the presence of short-tenure workers (women and fixed-term workers) are 
indicators of a climate of industrial relations where Italian firms are oriented to obtain a higher 
degree of functional flexibility and merely act as cost reducers rather than allow employees’ 
financial participation in the enterprises’ results. Conversely, under conditions of employment 
stability, repeated game solutions and mutual monitoring are more common and motivate greater 
recourse to VP, which is deducible from our results and was also found for Germany by Heywood, 
Hubler and Jirjahn (1998). 
Finally, the probability of VP is positively associated with training. Indeed, qualified workers are 
expected to obtain enterprise bonuses and these premiums are most likely more important when 
firms intend to reduce the turnover costs of training new employees with firm-specific skills. The 
use of VP contracts may act as a commitment device for workers whose specific skills are enhanced 
by training investments that are sponsored by firms (Acemoglu, 1997). Moreover, we seem to have 
confirmation that is supported by other countries’ recent experiences (Jones et al. 2012) of this 
pattern: training provided at the enterprise level encourages workers and firms to bargain over the 
expected returns of firm-specific skills’ accumulation (Hashimoto, 1981).  
 
IV Estimates  
Potential problems with standard OLS estimates are endogeneity and reverse causality. Thus, we 
adopt an instrumental-variable approach that requires finding instruments that can predict the 
education level of entrepreneurs without directly affecting the probability of VP. 
As instruments for education, we consider the province/sectoral share of individuals with a 
tertiary level of schooling over the total population; the relevant data are drawn from the Census 
data of 2001. Indeed, the human capital endowments that were found in the local markets in 2001 
are persistent over time and significantly associated with the schooling level of entrepreneurs who 
operated in the same geographical/sectoral area in 2010. In other words, provinces/sectors that were 
characterised by a large share of graduates in 2001 have a high probability of having highly 
educated entrepreneurs in firms that still operated in the same province/sector ten years later. 
Conversely, the province/sectoral share of individuals who had a tertiary level of schooling in 2001 
is unlikely to be correlated with our dependent variable, namely, the incidence of VP in the same 
productive area in the year 2010. This lack of correlation exists because the share of VP contracts is 
affected by institutional changes of wage settings that are quite variable over time, which has been 
shown by previous studies on Italy (Damiani and Ricci, 2011; Casadio, 2010). 
As an additional instrument, we use an indicator that is represented by the existence of an 
industrial district in 1999. In this case, the existence of a district is expected to be negatively 
correlated with the level of schooling of entrepreneurs who operated in the same district ten years 
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later. We made this hypothesis because Italian districts are generally characterised by family-owned 
firms that specialise in traditional (low-intensity technological) sectors and related workforce 
features that are expected to discourage upgrading the education of entrepreneurs over time. In 
contrast, belonging to an industrial district in 2000 is unlikely to affect the diffusion of VP in 2010. 
In Table 3 (specifically, the third column), we obtain that the coefficients associated with our 
instruments show the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level. The second-stage estimates 
are reported in column 1 and they offer a validation of our key result: the education of entrepreneurs 
is a signal of quality that positively influences the use of incentive policies, and furthermore, the 
magnitude of this impact is even higher than in previous estimates. In addition, notice that for most 
of our control variables we have confirmation of our OLS results. Some minor changes are related 
to exposure to international markets (and they are not significant in the IV estimates) and to the 
schooling of workers; for the latter variable, IV estimates offer clearer evidence of a negative link 
between the education of employees and the use of VP. 
 
4.3. The adoption of different VP schemes 
The dependent variable considered in our previous estimates is any type of VP scheme. In this 
section, we present the results for OLS and IV models that were obtained when we estimated the 
probability of using specific VP schemes at the individual, team or establishment level. Overall, the 
results are quite similar even if some specific features emerge for the team incentives. In particular, 
for team-type VP schemes, the coefficient associated with the tertiary education of entrepreneurs is 
lower and it is significant in the OLS estimates but not in the IV estimates. Indeed, according to the 
IV estimates reported in Table 5, we obtain that the presence of high-quality entrepreneurs increases 
the probabilities of individual bonuses (by 1.7 percentage points) and of establishment bonuses (by 
1.3 points); furthermore, the causal effects are significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Conversely, for team bonuses no significant causal effects can be identified.  
A rationale for this finding is that at least in the Italian economy, team-type VP may represent an 
intermediate configuration between individual and establishment schemes because team-type VP is 
less preferable for a number of reasons. First, with respect to individual VP, such schemes are 
affected by the well-known free-riding problems and are less powerful in terms of incentives’ 
effects. In addition, team incentives are not exempt from other failures because low-ability workers 
expect that teaming-up with higher-ability colleagues would raise their wages; conversely, the high-
ability workers expect a reduction of their pay for the same reason, and thus, an adverse-selection 
problem is created (Hamilton et al. 2003). Moreover, team bonuses do not present all of the 
advantages of bonuses offered at the establishment level, such as profit sharing, which reduces the 
fear of segmentation inside the firm, enhances cooperation among a larger group of peers and leads 
to superior Nash equilibria (Fitzroy and Kraft, 1987).  
In sum, our results seem to suggest that if employees’ financial participation is not restricted to 
subgroups of the workforce, VP schemes may reduce existing inequalities and increase commitment 
and are desirable policies (Poutsma, 2006).  
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Other results concerning the determinants of the three different types of VP are obtained for the 
role of size, which is higher for VP offered at the establishment level. Finally, product innovation 
only has significant influence (at the 5% level) on VP schemes that are offered at the establishment 
level; it plays no role in explaining team and individual bonuses.  
 
Conclusions 
The present paper contributes to the understanding of factors that can explain how the pay 
system of Italian firms is designed and to what extent VP is offered at the individual, team, or 
establishment level. We test the role of the skills of entrepreneurs, which is captured by an indicator 
of their education level, on the diffusion of VP in Italian firms, which is represented by a large 
majority of small family firms. We found that this indicator of quality plays a central role. Indeed, 
our most important result is that the presence of an entrepreneur with a university degree 
significantly increases the overall probability of the adoption of a VP scheme of any type. In 
addition, we find that highly educated entrepreneurs are more likely to use collective forms of pay 
systems at the establishment or individual level rather than the team level. These results were 
obtained by controlling for a wide set of variables and validated by IV estimates, and furthermore, 
they are robust with respect to unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. This 
robustness suggests a direct causal link between the education of entrepreneurs and the adoption of 
incentive schemes of different types, especially at the individual or firm level. Furthermore, we 
have tested the role of firms’ control structure, i.e., the influence of governance features on the 
adoption of VP, which is a key issue in the corporate-governance debate. Our results indicate that 
firms run by external managers rather than family owners are more oriented to adopt any form of 
variable payments.  
Our concluding remarks concern the policy implications of our work. It is well known that 
many studies have revealed the crucial influence not only of deepening capital but also of the 
organisational strategies of Italian firms in explaining productivity performances. Furthermore, 
these factors highlight the significant slowdown recorded in Italy in the last few decades (Daveri 
and Jona-Lasinio 2005). Enhanced investments in the ‘quality’ of entrepreneurs may promote a 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics ( with sampling weights)     
 
Mean  St dev Min  Max 
 
    Variable Pay (VP) 0,06 0,23 0,00 1,00 
Individual level VP 0,02 0,15 0,00 1,00 
Team level VP 0,01 0,09 0,00 1,00 
Establishment level VP  0,04 0,19 0,00 1,00 
Management characteristics 
    
Tertiary education 0,23 0,42 0,00 1,00 
Upper secondary education 0,54 0,50 0,00 1,00 
Lower secondary education 0,22 0,42 0,00 1,00 
18 <age <40 0,11 0,32 0,00 1,00 
39 <age<60 0,60 0,49 0,00 1,00 
age>59 0,28 0,45 0,00 1,00 
Workforce characteristics 
    
% tertiary education 0,09 0,17 0,00 1,00 
% upper secondary education 0,44 0,30 0,00 1,00 
% lower secondary education 0,48 0,34 0,00 1,00 
% trained employees 0,20 0,34 0,00 1,00 
% fixed term contracts  0,14 0,22 0,00 1,00 
% female 0,36 0,29 0,00 1,00 
Firm characteristics 
    
Family firm 0,89 0,31 0,00 1,00 
Gest_man 0,04 0,19 0,00 1,00 
Foreign market 0,24 0,43 0,00 1,00 
ln(Ros) 11,64 1,26 3,58 19,50 
Product innov. 0,40 0,49 0,00 1,00 
Process innov. 0,32 0,47 0,00 1,00 
North -West 0,29 0,46 0,00 1,00 
North- East 0,27 0,44 0,00 1,00 
Centre 0,22 0,41 0,00 1,00 
South 0,22 0,41 0,00 1,00 
5< n. employees<15 0,71 0,45 0,00 1,00 
14< n. employees<50 0,23 0,42 0,00 1,00 
49< n. employees<250 0,05 0,22 0,00 1,00 
n. employees>249 0,01 0,09 0,00 1,00 
Quarrying, Mining etc 0,00 0,05 0,00 1,00 
Manufacturing 0,30 0,46 0,00 1,00 
Gas, water and gas distribution 0,01 0,10 0,00 1,00 
Construction 0,14 0,35 0,00 1,00 
Retail and wholesale 0,22 0,41 0,00 1,00 
Trasportation  0,03 0,18 0,00 1,00 
Hotels and restaurants  0,11 0,31 0,00 1,00 
Insurance, monetary and financial 
intermediation  
0,01 0,11 0,00 1,00 
Real estate and rental 0,04 0,20 0,00 1,00 
Information, comunication and  other business 
services 
0,08 0,28 0,00 1,00 
Health, education and social services 0,02 0,15 0,00 1,00 
Sports, entertainment and others 0,03 0,16 0,00 1,00 
 
    





Table 2: Linear probability regressions of adoption of VP schemes 
 















         tertiary educ. (0/1) 0,094 *** 0,008 0,082 *** 0,009 0,065 *** 0,009 
secondary educ. (0/1) 0,028 *** 0,006 0,028 *** 0,007 0,022 *** 0,007 





age>59 0,027 *** 0,009 0,020 ** 0,010 0,021 ** 0,010 
Workforce characteristics 
        
 
% tertiary educ. 






% secondary educ. 
   
-
0,030 *** 0,010 -0,046 *** 
0,010 
% trained 
   
0,054 *** 0,008 0,051 *** 0,009 
% fixed term contracts 
   
-
0,082 *** 0,013 -0,068 *** 
0,014 
% females 
   
-
0,067 *** 0,012 -0,059 *** 
0,012 
Firm characteristics 
        
 
Family firms 
      
-0,094 *** 0,011 
Managers 
      
0,061 *** 0,017 
Foreign market 
      
0,015 * 0,008 
ln(Ros) 














North West  0,057 *** 0,007 0,051 *** 0,007 0,037 *** 0,007 
North East 0,084 *** 0,007 0,077 *** 0,008 0,064 *** 0,008 
Centre 0,051 *** 0,007 0,052 *** 0,008 0,039 *** 0,008 
14< n. employees<50 0,059 *** 0,005 0,060 *** 0,006 0,046 *** 0,006 
49< n. employees<250 0,225 *** 0,010 0,237 *** 0,012 0,200 *** 0,012 
n. employees>249 0,407 *** 0,018 0,431 *** 0,022 0,371 *** 0,024 
Sector dummies (Yes ) (Yes) (Yes) 
Constant 0,040 ** 0,023 0,071 *** 0,026 0,142 *** 0,044 
          F( ) 86,400 58,370 48,180 
Prob. > F 0,000 0,000 0,000 
R-squared 0,183 0,203 0,215 
N. of obs. 13206 10530 10106 
Source: RIL-ISFOL data. Note: omitted variable: entrepreneur with primary  education and  age <40 % workers 




Table 3: Instrumental variable estimates of adoption of Variable Pay 
 











      tertiary educ. (0/1) 0,265 *** 0,091 
   secondary educ. (0/1) 0,135 *** 0,052 -0,570 *** 0,007 
39 <age<60 0,024 ** 0,011 -0,071 *** 0,010 
age>59 0,056 *** 0,019 -0,177 *** 0,011 
Workforce characteristics 
      % tertiary educ. -0,109 *** 0,040 0,368 *** 0,018 
% secondary educ. -0,088 *** 0,022 0,203 *** 0,012 
% trained 0,049 *** 0,009 0,010 
 
0,008 
% fixed term contracts -0,052 *** 0,016 -0,086 *** 0,019 




      Family firm -0,078 *** 0,013 -0,076 *** 0,008 
Gest_man 0,042 ** 0,019 0,092 *** 0,010 
Foreign market 0,008 
 
0,008 0,036 *** 0,008 
ln(Ros) 0,000 
 
0,003 0,012 *** 0,003 





Process innov. 0,002 
 
0,008 0,021 *** 0,008 
North West 0,036 *** 0,008 0,005 
 
0,010 
North East 0,074 *** 0,009 -0,045 *** 0,010 
Centre 0,051 *** 0,009 -0,064 *** 0,011 
14< n. employees<50 0,035 *** 0,008 0,056 *** 0,007 
49< n. employees<250 0,174 *** 0,017 0,132 *** 0,010 
n. employees>249 0,331 *** 0,030 0,180 *** 0,013 
Sector dummies (yes) (yes) 
Share of graduates 2001 
   
1,601 *** 0,276 
Industrial district 1999 
   
-0,055 *** 0,008 
Constant 0,062 
 
0,059 0,386 *** 0,043 
       F(.) 46,750 1119,5 
Prob.> F 0,000 0,000 
Centred R2 0,183 0,610 
Un-centred  R2 0,283 0,740 
N. of Obs. 10019     10019 
Source: RIL-ISFOL data. Omitted variables: entrepreneurs with elementary education and 
age <40 %, workers with primary  education, South; firms with number of  employees<15. 











Table 4 Linear probability regressions of different Variable Pay schemes 
 















         tertiary educ. (0/1) 0,024 *** 0,006 0,015 *** 0,004 0,065 *** 0,008 




0,003 0,020 *** 0,005 











0,005 0,022 *** 0,009 
Workforce characteristics 











0,005 -0,021 ** 0,009 
% trained 0,030 *** 0,006 0,018 *** 0,005 0,048 *** 0,007 
% fixed term contracts  -0,035 *** 0,008 -0,019 *** 0,006 -0,060 *** 0,011 
% females -0,026 *** 0,008 -0,009 
 
0,006 -0,045 *** 0,011 
Firm characteristics 
         Family firm -0,037 *** 0,008 -0,019 *** 0,006 -0,078 *** 0,010 
Gest_man 0,051 *** 0,014 0,028 ** 0,012 0,069 *** 0,017 
















0,004 0,015 ** 0,006 





North West 0,027 *** 0,005 0,002 
 
0,004 0,029 *** 0,006 
North East 0,028 *** 0,005 0,005 
 
0,004 0,043 *** 0,007 
Centre 0,021 *** 0,005 0,000 
 
0,004 0,030 *** 0,007 
14< n. employees<50 0,017 *** 0,004 0,008 *** 0,003 0,033 *** 0,005 
49< n. employees<250 0,077 *** 0,009 0,050 *** 0,007 0,187 *** 0,011 
n. employees>249 0,234 *** 0,021 0,163 *** 0,018 0,471 *** 0,023 
Sector dummies 
         constant 0,064 ** 0,030 0,048 ** 0,023 0,046 
 
0,038 















  N- of Obs.  10106     10106     10106     
Source: RIL-ISFOL data. Omitted variable: entrepreneurs with primary education and  age <40 %, workers 
with elementary education; South; firms with n. of  employees<15. 






Table 5: Second stage regressions of probability of Variable Pay  schemes 
   
 





 st er. 
Coef. 
  






         tertiary educ. (0/1) 0,166 *** 0,064 0,027 
 
0,046 0,129 * 0,077 





39 <age<60 0,015 ** 0,008 0,002 
 
0,006 0,015 * 0,009 
age>59 0,034 *** 0,013 0,004 
 
0,009 0,034 ** 0,016 
Workforce 
characteristics 





% secondary educ. -0,036 ** 0,015 -0,009 
 
0,011 -0,034 * 0,019 
% trained 0,029 *** 0,006 0,019 *** 0,005 0,047 *** 0,008 
% fixed term contracts -0,024 ** 0,011 -0,018 ** 0,007 -0,055 *** 0,013 
% female -0,026 *** 0,009 -0,009 
 
0,006 -0,045 *** 0,011 
Firm characteristics 
         family firm -0,026 *** 0,009 -0,018 ** 0,007 -0,073 *** 0,012 
gest_man 0,038 ** 0,015 0,026 ** 0,012 0,063 *** 0,018 
















0,004 0,016 ** 0,006 





North West 0,023 *** 0,005 0,002 
 
0,004 0,028 *** 0,006 
North East 0,033 *** 0,006 0,005 
 
0,005 0,046 *** 0,007 
Centre 0,026 *** 0,006 0,001 
 
0,005 0,034 *** 0,008 
14< n. employees<50 0,009 * 0,005 0,007 ** 0,004 0,029 *** 0,006 
49< n. employees<250 0,059 *** 0,012 0,048 *** 0,009 0,180 *** 0,015 
n. employees>249 0,210 *** 0,025 0,162 *** 0,020 0,460 *** 0,027 








          F(.) 16,050 8,520 56,300 
Prob > F 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Centered R2 0,095 0,097 0,290 
Un-centered R2 0,143 0,122 0,360 
N. of Obs. 10019 10019 10019 
Source: RIL-ISFOL data. Note: omitted variable entrepreneur with primary education and  age <40 %, workers with 





Table A1: Variable definitions 
Education of 
entrepreneurs and Workforce 
 
Tertiary education  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneurs have a tertiary 
education (post-secondary education) and 0 otherwise 
Secondary education A dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneurs have a secondary 
education and 0 otherwise 
Primary education A dummy variable that equals 1 if the entrepreneurs have a primary or 










characteristics   
 
% Fixed-term contracts  The percentage of fixed-term workers  
% Training  The percentage of total employees trained 
% Females The percentage of women relative to the total number of employees 
Wage practices   
VP A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts VP payments of any 
type and 0 otherwise. 
VP- Individual level  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts VP payments at the 
individual level and 0 otherwise. 
VP-team level  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts VP payments at the 
team level and 0 otherwise. 
VP-establishment level   A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts VP payments at the 
establishment or enterprise level and 0 otherwise. 
Firm characteristics  
Firm Size   The total number of employees divided in four classes by size 
Family firm A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is run by family owners and 0 
otherwise.  
Gest_man. A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is run by professional 
managers and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign market  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 otherwise. 
Ln (Ros) The percentage return on sales, operating profits/total sales (ln 
transformation) 
Product innov. A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm undertook product innovation 
in the three years before the survey and 0 otherwise 
Process innov.  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm undertook process innovation 
in the three years before the survey and 0 otherwise 
North-West  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Italy’s North-
Western regions and 0 otherwise. 
North-East A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Italy’s North-
Eastern regions and 0 otherwise. 
Centre  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Italy’s Central 
regions, and 0 otherwise 
South A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Italy’s Southern 
regions and 0 otherwise. 
Instruments   
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Share of graduates 2001 The province/sectoral share of individuals with a tertiary level of 
schooling relative to the total population, drawn from the Census data in 
2001. 
Industrial district 1999 An indicator of the existence of an industrial district in 1999 in the 
location of firms 
Source: RIL Survey, ISFOL  
 
